

CAMP SECURITY AND STAFF SAFETY



KEY MESSAGES

- ▶ Physical safety and security is a core component of protection in refugee and IDP camps.
- ▶ The physical protection of refugees and IDPs, and maintaining law and order in camps, is the responsibility of the State. Nevertheless, humanitarian agencies have an important role to help identify the threats camp residents are exposed to, determine and implement measures that can prevent or mitigate the impact of such threats and provide support to national authorities.
- ▶ The most prominent security threats in camps consist of a general breakdown in law and order, crime and violence, the militarisation of camps and tension between the host and displaced communities.
- ▶ Ensuring security and the safety of camp staff involves managing risk. The level of risk depends both on the level of threat and the level of vulnerability to that threat. Staff and camp residents are often affected by different threats to their safety and security.
- ▶ Camp Management Agencies need knowledge of the context and its actors and their motives, along with an awareness of the situation on the ground and how it is changing. This will inform a systematic and effective approach to security and staff safety.
- ▶ Early warning and effective communication systems are vital to be able to monitor, communicate and address the situation appropriately.

! Key Terminology

- **Security** relates to the protection of camp residents, humanitarian staff and assets from danger and risk, such as violence, attack, damage or theft.
- **Safety** relates to ensuring the physical well-being of camp residents and staff.
- **Protection** is the overarching concept which incorporates security and safety, and concerns actions which uphold the human rights of camp residents and humanitarian staff.

INTRODUCTION

While threats to life, liberty and security are often reasons why people flee, such threats rarely cease after flight, but often continue to pursue displaced persons during all stages of the displacement cycle. Displacement, and the removal from the usual protective environment of one's own community, has the tendency to render persons more vulnerable to threats to security. In addition, traditional coping mechanisms, as well as the protective function of the family unit, will often have been reduced or disappeared entirely. While fleeing from harm, displaced persons can be perceived themselves as a cause of insecurity, especially when arriving en masse and when resources in the host community are scarce.

Camps will generally be perceived by refugees and IDPs as a safe haven, as an area where they will be protected and assisted. Naturally, this is what camps are designated to provide and a goal to which all relevant stakeholders – importantly, including the displaced themselves – should work towards. But unfortunately, camps – as temporary structures meant to accommodate often different communities fleeing the trauma of persecution or violence – can also create an environment of lawlessness, attract violence and crime or be attacked by armed forces or groups. In situations of conflict, camps are often located in close proximity to warring parties or borders, which increases the threat of insecurity. Much of the work on security must be focused on the prevention of such threats from materialising.

►► *For more information on the location of camps, see chapter 7.*

It is the State that has the primary responsibility for the protection of all persons in its territory – whether refugees, IDPs or host communities – and for ensuring public order and security from internal and external threats. Human rights and humanitarian actors should not give assurances for security or safety as this risks creating a false sense of security. These actors do, however, have an important responsibility to take protective measures to help reduce exposure to and mitigate the devastating effects of violence.

! Security Terms Defined:

- **threat:** a danger to a camp resident, to camp staff, to the Camp Management Agency or to assets or property
- **vulnerability:** the level of exposure to a particular threat or danger
- **risk:** the likelihood and the impact of encountering a threat

Security involves the management of risk – making risk assessments, whereby: $\text{risk} = \text{threat} \times \text{vulnerability}$.

►► *For more information on protecting persons with specific needs who may be particularly vulnerable, see chapters 10 and 11.*

This chapter will look at three broad categories of threats that refugees and IDPs in camps are most commonly exposed to. They are intrinsically interrelated in that the realisation of the threats and activities to mitigate their impact in one category will have direct impact on all other categories:

- threats arising from a general break-down in law and order, including individual or collective acts of crime, violence – such as the infliction or threat of physical, mental, sexual or other harm or suffering, which may result in injury, death, physical or mental disability or deprivation
- threats arising in the context of armed conflict; for example, at the hands of or as a result of the activities of armed forces and groups who are parties to a conflict
- threats arising as a result of communal or intra-group tension, either within the refugee and IDP population – for instance, along ethnic and/or religious lines – or between the refugees and IDPs on the one hand, and the host population on the other – for instance, owing to competition for scarce resources, such as land, water or firewood.

Staff safety for a Camp Management Agency may in many ways be linked with the safety and security of refugees and IDPs. However, humanitarian staff may not be exposed to the same threats as refugees and IDPs, or have the same levels of vulnerability to those threats. A person's gender, age, health, ethnicity, religion, language and social status, amongst other characteristics, will affect their level of vulnerability to a particular threat. In a camp situation, an unaccompanied child is likely to be more vulnerable to forced recruitment, or a member of a particular ethnic group may be more vulnerable to abuse, violence or murder.

The Camp Management Agency's knowledge of the context in which they are working, and an understanding of the stakeholders involved and their motives, is therefore an essential starting point for assessing the security threat and the risk for agency staff and camp residents.

When camp staff are safe and assets are secure, agencies are able to maintain a presence in the camp, which in turn can have a positive impact on upholding the safety, security and protection of camp residents. When risks to staff are well-managed, staff will be able to better deliver assistance to those who need it. Restrictions of movement that security risks impose on humanitarian actors – and the subsequent reduced access to populations of concern – create an additional security risk for refugees and IDPs as they are denied the protection and assistance they require. Agencies should have their own staff security regulations and standard operating procedures (SOPs), of which all staff should be aware. It is advisable that security and evacuation procedures and arrangements are carefully planned in close coordination with all the affected organisations, as well as relevant government institutions.

KEY ISSUES

BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER: CRIME, VIOLENCE AND ABUSE

As in any community, small or large, the smooth running of a camp depends on the mutual respect of the community's members and their willingness to address conflicts and disputes in ways acceptable and adhered to by the community at large. A breakdown of law and order can have many contributory factors. While the State authorities have the ultimate responsibility to provide security to those on its territory, national or local authorities may lack the capacity – or the willingness – to provide protection for refugee and IDP camps. This can be aggravated by other factors, such as the presence of armed conflict and the collapse of institutions

and infrastructure. In some cases, the State itself may be supporting or condoning violence, attacks or abuse that have a direct impact on camp populations. The displaced persons themselves may struggle with traumatic experiences, anxiety and high levels of stress associated with displacement and their situation. In combination with poverty, lack of education and limited livelihood opportunities – together with a breakdown of social norms and values – this situation is likely to lead to a marked increase in crime, exploitation and abuse in the public as well as the private sphere.

Such threats can range from a variety of minor offences, such as theft and vandalism – but also more serious forms of intimidation and exploitation or serious crimes, including physical assault, murder and forced disappearances. In camps, gender-based violence (GBV) remains the most common crime, also occurring often in the domestic sphere. Rape and sexual assault, abuse or humiliation and sexual exploitation – including forced prostitution and sex in exchange for aid – are all examples of GBV that can occur in camp settings.

▶▶ *For more information on GBV, see chapter 10.*

Having lost the protection of their homes, families and communities, and lacking resources such as shelter, food and water, displaced persons frequently find themselves at greater risk of being subjected to violence, while at the same time their ability to recover from its harmful effects is undermined. Their situation also limits the capacity of individuals and families to themselves address their security concerns. The often closed environment of camps and settlements – coupled with anxiety, desperation, marginalisation and the lack of hope about a durable solution – contributes to an increase in both the frequency and seriousness of such acts of violence.

CAMP MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

While maintaining law and order is the responsibility of the State, Camp Management Agencies should have an awareness of all aspects of daily life in the camp, including incidents of crime, violence and abuse. Camp Management Agencies need an understanding of the causes of breakdowns in law and order, as well as the measures and policies that may prevent lawlessness. They also have a role in helping to facilitate mandated protection agencies to respond to protection risks, not least through effective information management and coordination.

▶▶ *See chapters 4 and 5 for details on Coordination and Information Management*

They need to ensure that:

- Security experts are involved in security risk assessments and analysis. This should form the basis of security strategies, including standard operating procedures and contingency plans, together with a focus on risk mitigation and risk prevention. A risk assessment and analysis should include:
 1. the form and type of threat
 2. those targeted or otherwise at risk and the level of their vulnerability
 3. the actors involved and their motives
 4. existing capacity of the State to address the risks, the obstacles it faces and the kind of additional support needed
 5. the impact on persons of concern, the coping strategies they have adopted and the kind of support they themselves need to counter the risks involved.

- Camps are designed, to the extent possible, to take into account protection and security-based physical planning, including their location, layout design and access to services. Considerations will include:
 1. distance from armed conflict or other sources of violence
 2. size of the camp
 3. community participation in family plot layout
 4. allocation of adequate space per family
 5. safe access to resources, such as food, water and firewood
 6. services, such as police, camp management offices, sanitation facilities, schools, markets and community centres
 7. security lighting
 8. establishment of child-friendly spaces.

- An adequate number of trained and professional civilian police – including female officers – are deployed in close proximity to, but not inside, refugee and IDP camps. Protection agencies may provide law enforcement agencies with material and training support, including communications equipment, to help them in the exercise of their duties.

The community can be assisted in organising and managing – in cooperation with the police when feasible – community security patrols. Security patrols should be inherently civilian in character and personnel should receive adequate training in basic principles of law enforcement and be adequately supervised, monitored and equipped. Community-based initiatives should be encouraged

to communicate information through radio, theatre or printed media, providing objective security-related information and advice. This should include information on the obligations camp residents have with respect to camp regulations and law and order.

Adequate and equitable provision of relief assistance can reduce exposure or mitigate the effects of crime, violence and abuse. Relief distribution should take into account persons with specific needs and the needs of the host community. Adequate reporting mechanisms should be established for incidents of crime, violence and human rights abuses. There should be the provision of relevant and easy-to-understand information on when and how to access such mechanisms. A referral system must ensure that information on incidents is properly recorded, coordinated among and followed up by relevant agencies, and processed with due attention to confidentiality concerns.

It is important to ensure that community and camp management committees – including relief distribution committees – are non-discriminatory, participatory and representative, particularly of women and other groups with specific needs. All possible efforts must be made to ensure the community's engagement in education or vocational training, and cultural, religious and sports activities. This not only limits exposure to risk, it reduces the chances of persons resorting to violence, helps individuals recover from the effects of violence and helps build livelihoods.

MILITARISATION OF CAMPS

The civilian and humanitarian character of camps is an important protection standard which is critical to ensuring the safety and security of refugees and IDPs. This principle, however, is not always respected, and many refugee and IDP camps have been and are susceptible to militarisation. This is particularly the case where refugee and IDP camps are located in or close to a conflict area.

Militarisation of a camp means the infiltration of the camp by combatants. It may take the form of combatants infiltrating for rest, access to food and medical or other services, or for recruitment purposes – forced or otherwise – of members of the camp population. The militarisation of camps may lead to an increase in physical and sexual violence, a breakdown in law and order, attacks on the camp from the neighbouring country or armed forces or groups and diversion of humanitarian aid from the civilian camp population to members of the armed forces or groups. NGO and UN workers may have their access to the camp curtailed due to the presence of armed elements, or even face serious security risks themselves, including hostage-taking, assault or murder. If

camps are under the control of armed groups, the host government may react by refouling – forcibly sending back – the refugee population or limiting local integration possibilities. Additionally, voluntary repatriation possibilities or return to their place of origin may be jeopardised for refugees or IDPs, either by the armed group or the country of origin. Militarisation of a camp invariably has a profoundly negative impact on relationships between the camp and the host population. In some cases, the warring parties may use the camp strategically as a human shield, in case of attack.

At the beginning of an operation, it is especially important to ensure that armed elements, whether combatants or armed civilians, are identified. Combatants should be separated from the civilian population and interned elsewhere. Armed civilians should be informed that arms are not permitted in the camp and where possible, disarmed by the relevant authorities. The national authorities are primarily responsible for such procedures, but the international community may need to assist States to develop their capacity to do so.

! A knowledge and understanding of the operating environment, other actors and the political, economic, social and cultural features that affect the context and the level of risk, is essential for effective safety and security planning. It is important to monitor the context continuously, so security systems can be adapted in line with prevailing or predicted dangers.

The Camp Management Agency has responsibilities to:

- work with security staff to establish early warning and preparedness mechanisms aimed at identifying and responding to potential security threats, including armed conflict and the infiltration of armed elements into camps
- ensure that preventative security measures are taken to reduce the possibility of attacks on the camp or infiltration by armed elements. These may include:
 1. establishment and training of refugee/IDP camp security committees
 2. using information and communication campaigns or other activities to sensitise the community about the negative impact of militarisation
 3. ensuring camps are located away from areas of active conflict, or areas known to be inherently unstable or suffering from endemic violence.

- hold regular consultations with camp residents, including camp leaders and security committees, on security-related issues. Such consultations should give the refugees or IDPs a sense of shared responsibility for their own security and allow for discussions on what measures they feel can positively contribute to an improvement of their security
- ensure that agency staff are trained on militarisation and security issues and how to monitor changes in the context and indicators that point to increased threat
- prioritise effective security management, including risk assessment procedures and regular review of security strategies, SOPs and contingency planning, should security deteriorate
- conduct awareness-raising and sensitisation activities for the camp population.

If it becomes known that there are armed elements in the camp, the Camp Management Agency should notify the authorities and appropriate UN agencies. At the outset of the operation the Camp Management Agency should discuss this issue with other protection agencies working in the camp, and agree with whom the Camp Management Agency should share information in the event that it becomes aware of the presence of armed elements.

In situations of ongoing hostility and where appropriate, landmine awareness activities should be appropriately coordinated with all relevant actors. This should either be done by a specialised de-mining agency or, if not available, by a designated agency with awareness and experience.



‘Request for Political Support’ – A Voice from the Field

“One day before a political rally was due to take place in the town, the militia came to the site and ‘requested’ the camp leader to round up supporters amongst the camp community. The message he was told to deliver was that they should attend a discussion the following day in the town, about a housing scheme for the displaced.

However, the next day when the bus arrived to collect them, some camp residents were reluctant to go. The camp leader was threatened by the militia, and asked why he hadn’t done more to persuade the community. In no position to do otherwise, the camp leader had to board the bus, along with some friends, and attended the rally along with other ‘supporters’ from local IDP sites.”

Recruitment, Including the Recruitment of Children

States can require compulsory military service of its nationals. Armed groups have no such right. International humanitarian law prohibits host States from forcibly recruiting refugees into their national armed forces in times of war against the refugees' home country. More broadly, States should not recruit refugees – even though not explicitly prohibited under international law – as this would be inconsistent with the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum, undermine the refugee's right to seek and enjoy asylum, and violate the State's obligation to guarantee the physical safety of refugees. IDPs, on the other hand – if nationals of the country concerned – may be subject to compulsory conscription by the national armed forces. IDPs should, however, be protected by the State against discriminatory practices of recruitment into any armed forces or groups as a result of their displacement.

Under no circumstances should displaced children under the age of 15 – or under the age of 18, for States who are signatories to the Optional Protocol to the 1989 *Convention on the Rights of the Child*, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 May 2000 – be recruited, required or permitted to take part in hostilities. Displaced children, both boys and girls, may be at particular risk of forced recruitment or abduction for military, sexual or labour purposes, due to reduced social and community protection, discrimination or the lack of economic, educational and other opportunities. Unaccompanied or separated children may be even more vulnerable to recruitment, making prompt family tracing activities all the more important in situations where forced recruitment is a risk.

The Camp Management Agency needs to:

- conduct a situational analysis to identify groups or persons at risk of recruitment by armed forces or armed groups. This analysis should include an assessment of the possible agents of recruitment and the tactics used – for example, the abduction of children en route to and from school, or targeting areas of the camp that are poorly lit and away from the main road. Equally, it should include factors that make certain groups of the community more susceptible to recruitment – for example, age, gender or ethnicity
- ensure the development of measures to prevent illegal recruitment, including community awareness and community-based efforts. Ensuring that levels of assistance are adequate and fairly distributed, as well as providing income-generating activities, can also contribute to reducing the vulnerability of camp residents, and hence their risk of recruitment.

The Camp Management Agency should be prepared to play a central role in the task of monitoring and reporting any incidents of recruitment or attempted recruitment of children. It has a duty to:

- design and implement programmes which promote family livelihood activities, vocational training, recreational activities and health care for all children, including girls in order to make them less vulnerable to recruitment. The Camp Management Agency should either initiate such activities or lobby other agencies to do so
- reinforce educational opportunities, including for girls. While all children should be encouraged to attend school, it is possible that schools may become recruiting grounds for armed groups and they must be regularly monitored. Special measures, such as civilian security patrols, may need to be taken to protect children in schools if this threat exists
- individually register and document all children in the camp – especially unaccompanied or separated children. This is a vital protection tool to help prevent recruitment of children. Registration data can help to ensure that any recruitment in the camp or in the schools is detected early on, allowing for preventative measures to be taken
- use a participatory approach which includes seeking children’s input to preventive measures. The Camp Management Agency can provide support to adolescents to form youth groups and enlist UNICEF as a partner and resource in this and other youth activities
- pay special attention to the needs of former child soldiers and other children who were associated with an armed force or an armed group, as they are a group at particular risk of re-recruitment.

Civil-Military Relations

For humanitarian action to maintain its neutral character, it is imperative that it is clearly distinguished from the military. If this principle of distinction is not adhered to, the objectives of humanitarian and military action become intertwined, which will seriously undermine the capacity of humanitarians to serve refugees and IDPs.

At the same time, emergency operations increasingly take place in highly militarised environments, where humanitarian efforts would be seriously hampered if not supported and assisted by military resources. This is a highly complex issue that requires finding a



balance between upholding the neutrality and independence of humanitarian action, while acknowledging that in certain circumstances, support of the military will be needed. A lot of policy guidance exists on how relations between civilian and military actors should be conducted.

For Camp Management Agencies it is important to know that under certain conditions the military may be involved in humanitarian aspects of operations in order to fulfill a humanitarian obligation. This could be linked with providing security to refugee and IDP camps or the surrounding area and its population, providing security to humanitarian operations and humanitarian staff, or even outside the scope of security by, for instance, providing logistical support.

To conduct these activities while not confusing the humanitarian objective, it is necessary to establish close liaison arrangements, clear information-sharing networks, and be transparent towards the refugees and IDPs. Minimum guidelines for working with the military need to be included in strategic planning.

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE HOST AND LOCAL COMMUNITY

In a number of situations of forced displacement, the relationship between the surrounding, or host, community and the camp residents can be strained and create or exacerbate protection problems for camp residents. The presence of an IDP or refugee camp can also present security risks for the host community – for example, if it becomes militarised, or if law and order are not respected within the camp. On the other hand, good relations with the host community can play an important role in reducing protection problems or preventing them from arising. For example, the host community may have valuable information related to security or may be willing to facilitate the local integration of the camp population. A hospitable local community can also contribute to the well-being of the camp residents and assist them in leading dignified lives. The relationship between the two communities is therefore of utmost importance, and the Camp Management Agency must ensure, from the beginning, that attention is paid to the concerns of the host community and any sources of conflict. It must also ensure that measures are taken to maintain or improve a mutually beneficial relationship.

Conflict between the host and camp communities may exist for a number

of reasons, including ethnic or racial tensions, or fears on the part of the host community that the arrival of the camp residents will expose them to armed attacks, increased criminality or insecurity, or disease. The arrival of a large number of refugees or IDPs may also lead to increased competition over scarce resources, particularly in remote or underprivileged areas. Water, food, agricultural or pastoral land, as well as firewood, may be limited, and host communities, wanting to protect their access to such resources, may resort to violence or demand that national authorities take action to limit the camp residents' movement outside the camp.

The presence of humanitarian workers can also have a detrimental effect, culturally, environmentally and/or on the local economy, by, for example, pushing up prices. The conduct of agency staff towards the host and the camp population, and towards each other in public places, is important, as is an awareness of the unintended, but nevertheless negative, impact that humanitarian operations can have on a community. This may be especially true when the host population is in as much, and sometimes more, need of assistance than the camp community. National and local authorities, wanting to prioritise the needs of their own citizens, may enact measures which restrict the rights of camp residents, such as freedom of movement and the right to work.

As the environment is often a key source of conflict, attention needs to be paid from the beginning to preventing or limiting environmental degradation caused by the camp or its residents. This will reduce the burden placed on the host community and may also help to reduce tension between the two communities.

▶▶ *For more information on the environment, see chapter 6.*

 An important factor for both national and international staff is to understand the culture in which they are working, and to know how their project is perceived and how it relates to its context. If camp staff understand the local system of values and customs, they can act in a manner consistent with and acceptable to their host culture(s). This understanding is essential if they are to be able to successfully analyse and adapt to changing situations, and to the way in which a particular society functions, acts and reacts.

The Camp Management Agency should:

- play a role in undertaking a situational analysis to identify the sources of tension or potential for conflict between the camp residents and the host community. Using a participatory approach, the input of both the camp and host communities should be sought
- support and facilitate confidence-building measures, including regular meetings between the refugees/IDPs and host communities and establishment of joint committees with representatives of both communities
- support and facilitate sensitisation campaigns among the host community to foster a climate of understanding, acceptance and tolerance. These can be targeted at the community at large as well as at specific groups or institutions, such as schools, religious communities, local authorities and the media
- organise recreational and sports activities for the children of both communities
- support establishment of facilities and activities to which camp residents and the host community have equal access, such as health and educational institutions and services. This could involve maintaining or improving local infrastructure, such as roads, schools and hospitals, or constructing water installations to provide potable water to both the camp and host communities. It could include access by the host community to programmes set up for the camp population, such as skills training and other livelihood activities
- promote campaigns to sensitise both the camp and host communities to environmental concerns, including possible deforestation if collecting and cutting firewood is an issue of concern, and over-grazing if the IDPs or refugees have cattle or other animals with them
- advocate for and facilitate the implementation of environmental rehabilitation programmes, which could include reforestation if destruction of forests is an issue of concern. The establishment and support of environmental committees in which representatives of the host and camp community participate can further ensure good communication between the two communities on this issue
- advocate for improvements to assistance packages and programmes to ensure that natural resources needed by the host community are not overtaxed by camp residents. In situations of scarce firewood, this may mean the identification and distribution of alternative sources of heating and cooking which do not require firewood, or at a minimum, require reduced quantities of firewood
- set up and support conflict management and resolution forums to address issues in a timely manner before relationships become strained, or before tensions or violence destroy trust, in coordination with the lead protection agency.

STAFF SAFETY

The Camp Management Agency must make sure that sound security systems are in place. These will include gathering information about the situation in the camp and the local environment, assessing threats, risks and vulnerabilities, reporting and monitoring regularly. Systems should also be in place for incident reporting and for supporting staff with security issues, both in and out of working hours.

Field Staff Security – Voice from the Field

“Strikes hampered the opening and maintenance of a predictable, functioning and safe humanitarian corridor to access IDPs and supply assistance and protection to camps. In addition, strikes demanded the reorganisation of security strategies for camp management field staff. Camp management planning could never be considered separate from security, and in some cases security risks dictated that Camp Management activities were simply halted, even when needs in the camps were on the increase.

Travel to camp locations sometimes needed to be curtailed due to increased risk on the roads. When the team could no longer travel, protection monitors from the mobile team were placed in the camps for short periods at a stretch, given basic supplies like food, water, cooking fuel, petrol for vehicles, first aid and communications equipment. They became the eyes and ears of the camp – monitoring and reporting back to the office.

The complex security situation raised a number of challenges for the project:

- genuine fear and safety concerns from staff about going to the field
- a shortage of accurate and updated information coming in from the field about security
- politicisation of information coming from the formal parties involved
- an absence of consistent, coordinated interventions among humanitarian agencies
- a lack of a clear response to strikes, with some organisations conforming and closing offices and others remaining open for ‘business as usual’.



The following actions were taken by the team:

1. all field staff – including drivers and office personnel – were trained in security
2. security indicators were monitored and reviewed regularly
3. all strikes were observed and the office stayed closed
4. protection by presence was implemented whenever possible, whereby expatriate staff would travel with national staff to monitor in the IDP camps
5. a large and diverse team meant that camp management staff could be rotated in and out of the field to give staff days off and time to visit family members also living in situations of heightened risk
6. confidential reporting lines and referral systems were in place for reporting violations.”

Standard operating procedures (SOPs) for security of buildings, of agency property or for staff travel – together with appropriate communications, and including procedures on how to respond to security incidents – and an evacuation plan must be in place. All staff must be familiar with such procedures. Whilst individual agencies should have their own security management arrangements, it is important that the Camp Management Agency is aware of these arrangements and through coordination, ensures that all staff are covered.

 A standard operating procedure (SOP) is a security guideline that sets down ways of working and behaviour intended to reduce your vulnerability to a given threat and therefore to lessen the risk that it presents to you. It describes the preventive steps to take to reduce the possibility of an incident occurring, and in the event of an incident occurring, the steps to take to reduce the impact. For example, a guard will have SOPs to tell him/her how often to patrol a building, what equipment to carry and what to do in case of an incident.

The Camp Management Agency must also make sure that all staff are properly informed on security guidelines and have received security training. This is not only important for the security of the staff member but for the security of all colleagues working in the same operation. In conflict environments, Camp Management Agencies must have a security officer among their core field-based staff.

! The following three approaches to security each form part of what is known as the security ‘triangle’ for protecting staff and assets in insecure environments.

Acceptance Approach: Acceptance and goodwill from the camp residents and the host population (see below).

Protection Approach: Protective measures are taken to mitigate the threats, ranging from guarding an office, to evacuation plans – for example, radios, guards or window grills.

Deterrence Approach: Threatening retaliation to those who threaten – for example, legal, economic or political sanctions. This is not normally available to humanitarian organisations. Agencies can use suspension or withdrawal of programmes as a deterrent, as stated in the ECHO Security Guide.

The Camp Management Agency and all the staff who represent it should actively and consistently work to establish a good relationship with the displaced community. This is essential to the safety of Camp Management Agency’s staff, as it will give access to valuable security information, but also generate acceptance and trust. Camp Management Agency staff must uphold the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality at all times. Camp Management Agency staff should be sensitive to religious and cultural traditions.

At all times, Camp Management Agency staff should show exemplary behaviour, also when working under highly stressful conditions and be aware of how they are perceived. Rudeness, arrogance, unwillingness to listen, lack of respect for cultural norms and overall abusive behaviour will have a very negative impact on the agency’s credibility and affect staff security. All staff must strictly adhere to the code of conduct, training on which should be organised regularly. Misconduct of staff must be addressed and disciplined, if necessary.

! Image and Acceptance as an Approach to Security

Using image and acceptance as an approach to security involves humanitarian agencies spending time trying to learn and understand what people think about the agency's presence and programme. The way humanitarian organisations are seen by the community or communities in which they work affects not only the security of staff, but the overall success of programmes. Humanitarian agencies should first be clear of their own identity and how they would like to be perceived. Clarity on an agency's identity includes knowing the mission statement, principles and values that drive the agency – and then communicating these messages clearly and transparently to others.

The next thing is to consider how they are perceived by the communities in which they are working, and aim to build positive relationships as an approach to risk reduction. The factors that may influence how an agency is perceived include:

- mission, principles and values
- origin of the agency (including nationality and associated foreign policies of that nation)
- programmes and beneficiaries
- funding donors
- national partners
- how resources are being used
- recruitment and dismissal practices
- policies
- how staff are treated
- how the organisation behaves
- whom the organisation is in contact with
- personal behaviour of staff from the organisation.

❗ At times, the authorities insist on fencing a camp or putting in place other mechanisms to control exit and entry to the camp. At other times, the fencing can be requested by the community to enhance the physical security of the displaced population in the camp. In most situations it is preferable that the camp is not fenced and that freedom of movement is upheld.

❗ In areas that are prone to natural or industrial disaster, community-based contingency plans should be in place. The elements of the plan should include awareness-raising and education for all groups, early warning systems linked to government systems where possible, clear lines of communication, evacuation or hibernation plans and meeting points. Agencies should also have contingency plans in terms of emergency stocks and procedures.

CHECKLIST FOR A CAMP MANAGEMENT AGENCY

- The Camp Management Agency carries out context assessments of their operational environment. These include developing their situational awareness of the political, economic and cultural situation, the actors involved and their motives.
- The Camp Management Agency carries out risk assessments to identify security threats to camp residents and staff, and to establish their vulnerability to the threats.
- The Camp Management Agency employs security experts to be involved in risk assessment and analysis and in the development of security systems and standard operating procedures.
- Security systems and contingency plans, including evacuation plans, are shared with other agencies and coordinated to ensure that all staff are covered.
- Camp design and planning takes account of safety, security and protection issues, especially for the protection of those who may be most vulnerable to threats and those with specific needs.
- There are trained and professional civilian police deployed in proximity to, but not inside, the camp.
- The community participates in its own security through civilian security patrols, which are trained, supervised, monitored and equipped.
- Equitable assistance programming and protection in the camp reduces exposure to crime, violence and abuse.
- The community has opportunities to participate in education and vocational training, livelihoods activities, religious, cultural as well as sports and recreational activities in the camp.
- Community-based initiatives make it possible to communicate information on security issues. This may occur, for example, through radio, theatre, information leaflets or in committees or interest group meetings.

- ❑ Reporting mechanisms that are accessible and safe are in place, to allow camp residents to report incidents of crime, violence, human rights abuse or breaches in security.
- ❑ Referral systems for survivors of crime and violence are in place to ensure adequate care and follow-up.
- ❑ Regular monitoring of security indicators allows the Camp Management Agency to be aware of changes in the security level of the environment and to act accordingly.
- ❑ Camp committee members are trained in security-related issues and conduct awareness-raising programmes in the camp.
- ❑ Camp residents are consulted and involved in planning for effective safety and security.
- ❑ Standard operating procedures are in place, which set out how the Camp Management Agency should respond if it becomes aware of the presence of armed elements in the camp.
- ❑ Groups or persons at risk of recruitment by armed forces or groups have been identified, along with an assessment of the tactics used to recruit.
- ❑ Sources of tension and possible unrest between the camp and the host population and local community are understood by the Camp Management Agency.
- ❑ The Camp Management Agency is proactive in fostering positive and mutually beneficial relationships between the camp and the host community.
- ❑ Forums and systems are in place for representatives of the camp and host communities to meet regularly to address and resolve issues.
- ❑ The Camp Management Agency staff are aware of the impact of their presence in the community. They understand and communicate their agency's mandate and humanitarian objectives, and behave in ways that promote openness, respect and goodwill.
- ❑ The needs of the host community are taken into consideration in the planning and implementation of assistance in the camp.

TOOLS

 Almost all the tools, publications and other documents referred to are available on the Toolkit CD attached to every hardcopy binder. Weblinks are provided for downloadable online resources.

- **UNHCR, 1995. *Security Awareness: An Aide-Mémoire***
www.the-ecentre.net/resources/e_library/doc/7-SECAWE.PDF
- Camp safety handout (sample)

READING AND REFERENCES

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RedR UK, 2007. *Safety and Security Review. A Focus for Sharing and Learning in the Aid Sector. Issue 8.*

www.redr.org.uk/objects_store/security_review_no8.pdf

Hugo Slim, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2007. *A Guide to Mediation.*

Enabling Peace Processes in Violent Conflicts. [www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/d900SID/AMMF-785HZ9/\\$FILE/hdc-oct2007.pdf?OpenElement](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/d900SID/AMMF-785HZ9/$FILE/hdc-oct2007.pdf?OpenElement)

The Paris Principles: Guidelines on the Recruitment and Use of Children in Armed Conflict, 2007.

www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/Paris_Conference_Principles_English_31_January.pdf

UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, A/RES/54/263.

www.crin.org/Law/instrument.asp?InstID=1003

UNHCR, 2001. *Managing the Stress of Humanitarian Emergencies.*

www.the-ecentre.net/resources/e_library/doc/managingStress.PDF

UNHCR, 2007. *Handbook for Emergencies.*

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UNHCR, 2006. *Operational Guidelines on Maintaining the Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Asylum.*

www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain/open docpdf.pdf?docid=452b9bca2

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